dialogue raises an epistemic issue as well. Williams insists that the justice of Henry's cause is more than a common soldier knows. That sounds right, especially when we read the comically arcane legalisms and dubious histories Henry's advisors produce in Act 1 to convince him of his rightful title to French territory. What can Henry's soldiers be expected to know of the Salic law of succession or the genealogy of eighth-century French kings?
Bates adds a moral twist to Williams's epistemic doubts. Not only is the just cause "more than we know," it is "more than we should seek after." Williams's position and Bates's are importantly different. Williams is describing the epistemic plight of the common soldier. Bates offers prescription, not description. Not only are common soldiers not in a position to know whether their cause is just, they should not try to put themselves in a better position. Bates's reason: "we know enough if we know we are the King's subjects." Apparently deference to the King's political authority is supposed to imply deference to his epistemic authority as well.
Bates actually makes two distinct claims. One is that obedience to the king "wipes the crime out of us." Even if the soldiers knew the king's cause was unjust, they should still fight, because the king's authority provides an exclusionary reason to obey. Call this the absolute deference claim. The other is that soldiers should not independently investigate the jus ad bellum -for that is the natural reading of "more than we should seek after." Call this the no-inquiry claim. In what follows, I explore these claims, first Throughout, I use the word "soldiers" to refer generically to members of the active military forces of the contesting parties -recognizing that that includes sailors, fliers, and in some cases cyberwarriors and purveyors of other exotic technologies. I am generally speaking of "tip of the spear" war fighters, that is, those whose job directly includes committing acts of violence. Many of the same conclusions will apply to those in support roles, although the arguments must then be filtered through whatever moral principles apply to indirect participation in acts of violence.
For a thoroughgoing debate about the morality of selective conscientious objection, readers should consult the 2002 symposium issue on the subject in the Israel Law Review.
that of Williams and then the more problematic claims of Bates. To preview the conclusions: Williams is right; Bates's absolute deference claim is not. But I will defend a weaker version of Bates's prescription: not absolute deference to the King's authority, but strong presumptive deference that can be overridden only in cases where the war is manifestly unjust. This is a version of the no-inquiry claim: a manifestly unjust cause is one that wears injustice on its face, so that no inquiry is required.
This position about the obligations of common soldiers -not to fight in manifestly unjust wars, but not to delve into the justice of wars whose injustice is not manifest -is far from novel. It is the unanimous view of the early modern just war theorists Cajetan, Suárez, and Vitoria. But my argument for the no-inquiry claim will differ from theirs. I focus on the moral importance of civilian control of the military -a value I believe contemporary just war theorists wrongly neglect, just as I fear they underrate the inherent epistemic problems soldiers confront in judging jus ad bellum.
Williams's epistemic claim
Michael Williams's claim is that ordinary soldiers are in no epistemic position to judge whether the king's cause is just. Like his philosopher namesake 600 years later, Williams is no radical skeptic. 3 Nothing in principle makes knowledge of just cause inaccessible to the common soldier. The problem lies in contingent and context-specific challenges arising from the fog of war, including the political fog of going to war. 4 Philosophers perhaps underestimate the epistemic difficulty of judgments about just cause. Even when the purported just cause is self-defense, it isn't always self-evident The JAB court would include judges from every region of the world -a crucial structural feature adopted by all international tribunals.
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The problem is that the higher the stakes in any international body's decisions- Unfortunately, the soldiers who are the court's intended audience will discover in their first minutes on the Internet that reputable bodies have denounced some nominees as ideologues and complained that others were excluded for ideological reasons. Rather than alleviating their doubts, the JAB court will replicate them. In soldiers' minds, it will lack legitimacy, and that is because so many interested parties contest its legitimacy.
The difficulty is compounded in the case of hot-button issues, like Israel's wars. Suppose neither of them is willing to declare that a conflict includes acts of aggression. In fact, suppose the Security Council-determined to head off or even undermine the JAB court-declares there has been no aggression. How is a soldier supposed to conclude that the JAB court got it right while the Security Council and the ICC are wrong? Unless the JAB court can somehow displace the UNSC and ICC from the epistemic field, it will have a hard time establishing its own credibility.
All the points so far are challenges to the likelihood of establishing a JAB court that has legitimacy, yet is also able to reach consensus on controversial conclusions in the face of intense politicking around its membership and selection process. But suppose these challenges can be overcome. Daunting problems still remain. flying to figure out who started it and whose fault it was? For that matter, why would the warring parties let them in? Perhaps the JAB court will rely on local investigators. They too will have difficulty gaining access to conflict zones, and there is no reason to suppose they will get to see anything the belligerents don't want them to see.
A related problem is:
5. I am thinking especially of article 51 of the UN Charter, which declares that every state has an "inherent right of self-defense." As we know, the "inherent right of selfdefense" has proven more than a little controversial, not only among those philosophers who reject it, but among lawyers and diplomats trying to interpret it. The ICJ has, controversially, denied that states have an inherent right to defend themselves against terrorist attacks by non-state actors. 25 The United States, also controversially, expands the inherent right of self-defense to include preventive war, as well as drone strikes against terrorist groups in the territory of states unwilling or unable to control them.
Of course, one might think these controversies are exactly why we need a JAB court to settle the dispute and enunciate the normatively best criteria of self-defense.
Unfortunately, the court would face a lose-lose dilemma: plunge into the morass of legal arguments or ignore them. The former course would set it in competition with official tribunals (like the ICJ and ICC), and would risk submerging morality to legalisms. But if the JAB court ignores the law, why should soldiers accept its normative criteria when their state is claiming "inherent right of self-defense," which sounds pretty compelling? Of course, an authoritative JAB court finding that there is no just cause could stop there; lack of just cause by itself makes a war unjust. So the JAB court could limit its mandate to evaluating just cause, and dodge the problem of predicting the unpredictable.
But if, as some theorists plausibly argue, the justice of a cause turns on proportionality and necessity, even the just cause decision will be impossible for the court to tender.
For all these reasons, a JAB court will not be able to do the epistemic work that soldiers confronting the question of conscientious objection urgently need. That means they will have to deliberate on their own.
Once in a blue moon, the question of jus ad bellum will not be hard. Some might say that so few wars have been just that on purely statistical grounds soldiers in a situation of uncertainty should presume the war is unjust. 28 If you believe that, you should certainly not join the military. But presumably soldiers who take moral issues seriously enough to consider conscientious disobedience don't believe their country fights mostly unjust wars; otherwise, why did they enlist? Soldiers may be mistaken; but to take their dilemma seriously we must assume they think the wars their country has fought are mostly just. To persuade them otherwise will multiply their epistemic problems rather than solving them.
In short, we have every reason to believe that Williams's epistemic claim about the disability of ordinary soldiers in judging jus ad bellum in the fog of war and politics remains as true today as in Shakespeare's time. Regrettably, a JAB court would not remedy the problem.
Bates's absolute deference claim
What about Bates's claim that all this is beside the point, because "obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us"? I labeled this the "absolute deference" claim, We can take a clue from the law of jus in bello. Under international law, soldiers are required to disobey manifestly illegal orders, and this legal principle straightforwardly has its moral counterpart: you must disobey manifestly immoral orders, such as orders to shoot prisoners or non-combatant civilians, to torture captives, to condone rape, or to cover up war crimes. Conversely, military discipline requires soldiers to obey lawful orders, and international law permits obedience.
In doubtful cases, those that do not "fly the black flag of illegality," soldiers get the defense of superior orders unless they know the order is unlawful; and they disobey at their own risk, meaning that if the order was lawful, their mistaken belief that the order was unlawful will not protect them from whatever punishment their military code imposes. Thus, the in bello law of armed conflict incorporates a tripartite scheme of obligation and permission, depending on whether an order is lawful, manifestly unlawful, or unlawful but not manifestly so. Lawful orders may be obeyed, and manifestly illegal orders must be disobeyed. Orders unlawful but not clearly so, and not known to be so, may also be obeyed (and the soldier disobeys at her own peril). 35 The parallel tripartite 35 Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) sets out a prototype of this liability scheme. Superior orders do not relieve a person of criminal responsibility "unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful." scheme couched in moral terms would distinguish legitimate orders, orders of unclear moral propriety, and manifestly immoral orders.
The tripartite scheme undoubtedly puts a heavy thumb on the scale in the direction of obedience: in doubtful cases it strongly favors erring on the side of obedience -because then the soldier gets the superior orders defense -over erring on the side of disobedience. Nevertheless, the scheme incontrovertibly recognizes soldiers as moral and legal agents who are expected to evaluate the rights and wrongs of their actions. In other words, the tripartite scheme recognizes the inevitability of conscience even in a military role morality that assigns central importance to obedience and deference.
Suppose we adopt a parallel tripartite scheme for ad bellum judgments. A soldier ought to fight in just wars; to say otherwise is to embrace pacifism, and pacifists have no business becoming soldiers. 36 But soldiers should refuse to fight in manifestly unjust wars.
What about doubtful cases? One approach would require soldiers in doubt to err on the side of non-violence, by refusing to fight unless the war is manifestly just. The reasoning is simple: if there is even a possibility that you might kill someone in an unjust cause, don't put yourself in that position. But such reasoning is faulty, because it assumes that the moral risk lies exclusively in the decision to use violence. In a just war of selfdefense or a humanitarian intervention, that is not so, because the soldier who errs on the side of non-violence risks exposing those she is sworn to defend to mortal danger.
Innocent lives are at stake in either direction. . I do not explore the decision theory here. All decision-theoretic methods require assigning probabilities to outcomes. But in my view the Williams predicament means that soldiers will often be unable to assign even subjective probabilities in a way they regard as anything more than picking numbers out of a hat. The probabilities fall into the category of "unknown unknowns." Moreover, when one of the questions soldiers must answer, and about which they are uncertain, is "what is the best theory of just cause?" I believe that assigning probabilities to the competitor theories and running the numbers is a mistake. "What are the odds that utilitarianism is the best moral theory?" strikes me as a misguided question, although I recognize that some philosophers disagree. combat, such discipline is a life or death matter. 42 So there is a prudential point to discipline. But there is a moral point as well. Highly disciplined soldiers know when they must disobey orders because they are illegal -which already shows that discipline is far from the same thing as absolute deference.
More broadly, military discipline is the most important antidote to war crimes.
The disciplined soldier does not fire wildly out of panic. Discipline restrains soldiers from taking vengeance on prisoners and from raping and looting when their basest desires tell them to rape and loot. Disciplined obedience can lay genuine claim to being a role morality -a set of role expectations that fulfills a compelling moral purpose. 43 Disciplined obedience has to do with in bello decision-making. What about the ad bellum decision of whether to fight at all, our focus here? That decision is equivalent to the question whether to follow the orders to deploy given by the civilian political leadership. Here, the key argument for the role morality I have called "the tripartite scheme" is the crucial importance of maintaining civilian control of the military.
My impression is that theorists of just war have overlooked the moral importance of civilian control -it is rarely discussed in the philosophical literature on just war. 44 Possibly this is because most theorists live in democratic, civilian-led, countries where military coups and violence against civilians by garrisoned soldiers pose no serious threat. We lucky residents of advanced democracies take civilian control for granted. The oldest and most universal of all political problems involving militaries is how to domesticate a society's warriors -violent, proud men, mostly young, with a yen for action. 45 The world's oldest work of literature centers on the problem that King
Gilgamesh is at once "violent, splendid, a wild bull of a man, unvanquished leader, hero in the front lines, beloved by his soldiers ... ," but also "arrogant, his head raised high, trampling its citizens like a wild bull." 46 The central theme of the epic is the domestication of Gilgamesh. In the Hebrew Bible, Samuel warns of similar problems if the Hebrews insist on appointing a king to lead them in wars. 47 Plato discussed the problem in the Republic, when he asks how the Guardians can be fierce toward their enemies yet gentle toward their friends. All these are literary texts, but obviously they are based on real and bitter experiences that their audiences could readily recognize.
In the European Middle Ages, feudal retainers, roaming mercenaries, and garrisoned armies were a chronic source of murder, rape, and looting. As Blackstone warned with this history in mind, "In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms.... The laws therefore and constitution of these kingdoms know no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than that of war." is manifest. Bates's no-inquiry claim is wrong if it denies that manifest injustice matters, but right that the duty of inquiry stops there.
This is not a return to the unquestioned obedience celebrated by Tennyson and
Holmes -a wholly exclusionary obligation that forecloses conscience and deliberation.
But, between the unrestricted requirement of due diligence on the part of soldiers, and more limited version of the tripartite scheme, the political arguments grounded in civilian control of the military strongly favor the latter.
